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Reviews of American Smoa, the
Cook Islands, Hawai‘i, Tuvalu, and
Wallis and Futuna are not included in
this issue.
French Poly n e s i a
Recent developments in French Poly-
nesia can be viewed through the prism
of the forthcoming bumper election
year in 2001 when, by coincidence,
both the territorial and the municipal
governments come up for renewal.
Certainly the policies and machina-
tions of both the incumbent govern-
ment and the opposition parties were
designed with this prospect in mind.
The Tahoeraa government thus tried,
but ultimately failed, to repeat its
1996 feat of pushing through yet
a n o t h er s t a t u t o ry re f o rm redolent with
nationalist symbolism. By contrast,
the opposition united, and succeeded,
in their aim of re f o rming the terr i t o ry -
wide electoral boundaries in favor of
the urban constituency where their
parties are strongest. Unprecedented,
if anticipated, verdicts in the courts
saw both President Flosse and former
president Alexandre Léontieff con-
victed in separate cases of corruption.
This means that possibly Flosse, and
certainly Léontieff (who now sides
with the indépendentiste opposition)
will not be eligible to stand as candi-
dates in 2001. Down but not out, the
g o v e rnment pursued opulence-oriented
initiatives including the inauguration
of palatial offices for the presidency,
an entertainment complex, and a ter-
ritorial television station. The econ-
omy also worked to the government’s
advantage, putting in a solid perfor-
mance.
French Polynesia was progressing
steadily toward the new political sta-
tus of overseas country (pays d’outre
mer 1) in the latter half of 1999. The
draft constitutional law project was
adopted by the French national
assembly on 10 June and later by the
senate on 12 October. Notwithstand-
ing the concerted efforts of Deputy-
Mayor Michel Buillard and Senator-
President Gaston Flosse, France
rejected numerous proposals by the
territorial assembly to increase French
Polynesia’s powers under the new sta-
tus. Most important (and unlike the
a g reement reached by New Caledonia)
the transfer of specific powers to
French Polynesia as a pays d’outre
mer would not be definitive; in other
words, it could be reversed at a later
date. Nor did the French Polynesian
assembly realize its ambition to have
its legislation accountable only to the
French constitutional council. French
Polynesia also sought a major expan-
sion of its powers to negotiate inter-
national accords, including the a pri-
ori right to sign such agreements. This
claim too was rejected, as was the
quest to call the “country” Tahiti Nui
(T P, July 1999, 28–29; Nov 1999,
26–27).
Despite the limitations of the pays
d’outre mer status, Flosse pronounced
himself satisfied with the final version
of the constitutional amendment,
which had retained his much-vaunted
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conception of Polynesian citizenship.
(The enthusiasm for citizenship was
not shared by the opposition, which
considered it meaningless without
restrictions on the right to vote as
applied in the New Caledonia
re f o rms.) Flosse was very keen to 
push through the constitutional
change prior to the 2 0 0 1 elections, as
he believed new statutory gains would
p rovide a welcome boost to his part y ’s
electoral campaign. It was a major dis-
appointment for the president and his
g o v e rnment when the process of insti-
tuting the new status stalled at the
final stage of its approval. Such
changes to the French constitution
require the approval of a joint sitting
by the two houses of parliament,
known as a Congress of Versailles.
The session was planned for 24 Jan-
uary but was canceled indefinitely
because the opposition had signaled 
it would not approve an important
constitutional amendment relating 
to reform of the French legal system
that was scheduled for the same day.
Although the pays d’outre mer a m e n d-
ment had received bipartisan support,
the government was loath to organize
a joint sitting solely to consider it.
French Polynesia’s quest to be a
“country” was postponed to an unde-
termined future date (T P, January
2000, 32–33).
As flagged in the previous review
(von Strokirch 2000), the embittered
Deputy-Mayor Emile Vernaudon con-
tinued his crusade to bring down the
government of Flosse and his Tahoe-
raa party by whatever means neces-
sary. A centerpiece of his strategy was
to pursue electoral re f o rms that would
benefit the urban-based opposition
parties and severely disadvantage the
governing Tahoeraa party, which
relies heavily on votes from the outer
islands. To illustrate the disparities
under the current electoral law, last
modified in 1985, the largely urban
Windward Islands (Tahiti and Moo-
rea), which account for 74 percent of
the population, are allocated only 54
percent, or 22 of the 41 seats, in the
territorial assembly. Conversely, the
outer islands are allocated 46 percent
of the seats for only 26 percent of the
population. In practice, a candidate
from the Windward Islands needs an
average of 4,139 votes to be elected,
whereas their counterparts in the Lee-
ward Islands require 2,163 votes, and
in the Australs only 1,428 votes (c e s c
report 114, 27 April 2000). On the
g rounds that demographic trends have
rendered the existing electoral distrib-
ution highly inequitable, Vernaudon
argued that reform was well overdue.
Vernaudon’s first proposal for elec-
toral reform was tabled in the French
national assembly on 9 March 1999
and advocated the transfer of 7 of the
41 territorial assembly seats from the
outer islands to the Wi n d w a rd Islands.
Flosse was adamantly opposed, so
much so that he warned Minister for
Overseas France (d o m - to m) Jean
Jacques Queyranne that if the French
state “touches a single seat in the
outer islands Tahoeraa will boycott
the next elections” (T P, August 1999,
7). Rhetoric aside, Flosse recognized
that the current inequities were inde-
fensible and produced a counter pro-
posal to give the Windward Islands
an additional 4 seats and increase the
overall size of the territorial assembly
to 45 seats. On 23 November 1999
he presented this draft law to the
French Senate, which approved it but
increased the additional seats for the
Windwards to 6 for a total of 47.
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However, it transpired that Flosse’s
draft law included other elements that
would render it unconstitutional. This
led to Tahoeraa Party Deputy Michel
Buillard putting forward yet another
version of electoral reform to the
national assembly on 24 May 2000.
The Buillard draft law (jointly spon-
sored by former d o m - tom minister
Dominique Perben) envisaged an
additional 8 seats for the Windward
Islands, increasing the assembly to 
49 seats. The proposals by Flosse and
Buillard were concessions designed to
reduce the glaring inequities in repre-
sentation between the Windward
Islands and the outer islands and still
strongly favor the latter.
Before the question of the number
and distribution of seats had been
resolved, Vernaudon placed another
iron in the fire with a proposal to the
national assembly on 6 April 2000
to create a single electoral district in
French Polynesia instead of the exist-
ing five divisions among the archipel-
agos. Highlighting once again the
inequities of the existing system, he
argued that the democratic principle
of one person one vote should be
applied in keeping with the spirit 
of the French constitution. In effect,
Vernaudon’s reform would render 
the Tahoeraa party’s support base in
the outer islands virtually irrelevant 
in territorial elections. Flosse was
incensed, not only by Vernaudon’s lat-
est gambit, but even more by the fact
that the leader of the French socialist
party, François Hollande, openly sup-
ported what Flosse portrayed as a
blatant attempt to overthrow his gov-
ernment and drive French Polynesia
to independence. A French socialist
p a rty d e p u t y, F r a n c o is M e r l e, o b s e rv e d
wryly that “In reality, what Mr Flosse
cannot tolerate is that the absolute
power he has organized by clientilism
and by an electoral system that keeps
him in power in conditions of unjust
representation could be called into
question” (T P, May 2000, 7–10).
A complete bipolarization of terri-
torial politics ensued on the specific
issue of electoral reform. This was not
surprising as the stakes were high,
with the outcome likely to determine
whether the government or the oppo-
sition would win the 2001 territorial
elections. In March Vernaudon’s Ai‘a
Api joined forces with the pro-inde-
pendence parties, Oscar Temaru’s
Tavini and Jacqui Drollet’s Ia Mana,
to fight for their preferred version of
electoral reform. To this effect, on 15
March they issued a joint memoran-
dum, in which they argued that the
size of the assembly should not be
increased as it would place an unnec-
essary burden on the budget. They
also made known the intention of the
“progressive Polynesian parties” to
mount a joint list for the territorial
elections under the leadership of
Temaru. Vernaudon thus officially
abandoned his long-standing position
as an autonomist and pronounced
himself a souverainiste (a slight
semantic distinction from the usual
indépendentiste). Compared to earlier
Tavini policies the memorandum
exhibited a marked change in tone,
whereby it emphasized that indepen-
dence would by no means signify a
rupture in relations with France. They
expressed the hope that there would
continue to be cooperation via treaties
between equals in domains such as
the economy, currency, education, and
defense. They fully expected France to
continue current levels of financial
assistance in a postindependence con-
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text as a form of compensation for
the economic distortions caused by
thirty years of nuclear testing. The
three parties expressed their apprecia-
tion for discussions they had entered
into with the metropolitan socialist
p a rty on t h e se matters since J u ne 1999.
In the face of the perceived con-
spiracy between the united territorial
opposition and the metropolitan
socialists, Flosse summoned all avail-
able forces in April and May to defeat
Vernaudon’s proposed single electoral
division. First he gained the support
of municipal governments with no less
than 37 of the 48 territorial mayors
rallying in opposition to the Vernau-
don reform. This was an impressive
feat as it demonstrated how successful
the Tahoeraa government has been in
recent years with its policy of winning
allegiance from mayors via a selective
scheme of subsidies to the municipali-
ties. The government then gained the
support of an important territorial
institution, the Economic, Social and
Cultural Council (c e s c), which off i-
cially advises the government and par-
liament. The council severely criticized
the proposal for a single electoral divi-
sion on the grounds that it would dis-
advantage the outer islands, which
a l ready experience isolation and
neglect (c e s c re p o rt 1 1 4, 2 7 A p r i l
2 0 0 0). It later expressed itself in favor
of the Buillard electoral re f o rm. Pre-
dictably, the territorial assembly
(which acts as a rubber stamp for any
policies put before it by the govern-
ment) also rejected the Vernaudon
reform. Finally, and importantly,
given his role as the sole independent
voice in territorial politics, Mayor-
Assemblyman Boris Léontieff backed
the government’s electoral reform due
to his concern to maintain representa-
tion for the outer islands. This was an
interesting development as his Fetia
Api party’s electoral prospects would
have improved significantly under a
single electorate.
There was an intense period of
activity from March through to late
June as the two sides repeatedly sent
delegations of their leading lights to
Paris to lobby metropolitan political
parties and the national government
for their respective electoral reform
projects. Ultimately the socialist
government and its majority in the
national assembly opted for an elec-
toral reform falling somewhere
between the two preferences. Vernau-
don’s first proposal, to maintain the
size of the assembly at 41 seats while
augmenting the share of the Wind-
ward Islands from 22 to 29 seats, was
passed by the national assembly on
2 2 June. The Wi n d w a rd Islands would
henceforth receive 71 percent of the
seats in close proportion with its 74
percent share of the population. Spe-
cifically the outer island seats would
be reduced as follows: Leewards 8 to
5; Marquesas 3 to 2; Australs 3 to 2;
Tuamotu-Gambier 5 to 3. The draft
organic law must still go back to the
opposition-dominated senate in the
October 2000 session. Nevertheless,
in the event of differences, its fate will
finally be decided by a mixed commis-
sion from the senate and the assem-
bly, which usually comes down in
favor of the assembly. The French
government has also given notice that
it intends to push through the reform
as a matter of urgency so that it will
apply to the 2001 elections in French
Polynesia. Vernaudon’s second pro-
posal for a single electoral division,
however, was definitively rejected.
d o m - tom Minister Queyranne
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explained that such a change would
risk depriving the outer islands of rep-
resentation, as their interests would
become marginal for urban-based
political parties. He also noted that
the proposal had not obtained wide-
spread popular support in French
Polynesia (NT, 23 June 2000, 4).
In contrast to the subject of elec-
toral distribution, territorial parties
found themselves united in opposition
to the strict application of a metro p o l-
itan electoral law on gender parity.
On 8 July 1999 the French constitu-
tion was modified to enable a French
electoral law that will ensure an equal
number of men and women are pre-
sented as candidates on the electoral
lists of political parties. In the national
assembly’s first discussion of an
o rganic law to apply the new principle
of parity, Vernaudon was successful in
arguing for an amendment exempting
the overseas territories so that,
although their lists would include an
equal number of men and women,
they would not be obliged to have a
strict alternation of candidates by gen-
d e r. Later, Flosse persuaded the senate
to support the same amendment.
There was bipartisan consensus in the
territory that, on the grounds of cul-
tural particularity, their society was
not ready for the more radical inter-
pretation of parity. The law commis-
sion of the national assembly was not
in agreement with this territorial per-
spective and deemed it imperative that
national electoral laws be applied
without exception throughout the
republic. The matter was thus brought
back to the national assembly on 21
June and passed without the Vernau-
don amendment. The new parity law
will thus apply to the 2001 territorial
elections (NT, 22 June 2000, 3).
The parity law promises to hold
major ramifications for territorial pol-
itics, given that currently only 5 out
of the 41 t e rritorial re p resentatives are
women. It poses a challenge to politi-
cal parties, not only to find female
candidates willing and able to stand,
but also the vexed issue of which men
will assume a lower position on the
party list or bow out altogether. By
way of illustration, consider the fac-
tional deals made by the Tavini party
in recent years to co-opt leaders of
other opposition parties to their cause.
Jacqui Drollet and Alexandre Léonti-
eff, both leaders of near defunct par-
ties, joined the Tavini electoral alliance
in 199 6 because they were placed high
enough on the list to win. Another
convert, Jean-Marius Raapoto, unsuc-
cessfully ran as Tavini’s senate candi-
date in 1998 and no doubt believes he
has earned a seat in the next territor-
ial assembly. Similarly, Emile Vernau-
don will expect a safe spot on the list
if he goes ahead with his stated inten-
tion to campaign with Tavini in 2001.
In addition to Temaru himself, how
can these men and other leading lights
in the party all realize their political
ambitions if their names must alter-
nate with those of relatively unknown
female candidates? If any one of them
is not assured a seat in the assembly
they could well decide to abandon the
joint list, taking their loyal voters with
t h e m. Such scenarios may explain why
political leaders were so hostile to the
institution of parity.
In March another piece of French
legislation was passed with implica-
tions for the territory, but this time
specific circumstances were taken into
account as a result of determined lob-
bying by Flosse. The legislation con-
cerned the limit to be placed on the
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accumulation of political offices by
individuals. In view of his own accu-
mulation of the offices of national
senator, territorial president, and
mayor of Pirae, Flosse had pro-
nounced himself in favor of the gen-
eral principle but envisaged special
exemptions for French Polynesia. Not
surprisingly, one exemption would
allow him to retain his senatorial and
presidential positions concurrently.
Thus the ordinary law limiting the
accumulation of mandates was passed
by the national assembly on 8 March,
allowing national parliamentarians to
concurrently hold no more than one
of the following offices: president of 
a general council (the assemblies of
French departments), mayor, or presi-
dent of French Polynesia. A separate
organic law pushed through the sen-
ate by Flosse made further allowances
for the territory. This departure from
the new metropolitan law gave the
right for a territorial minister to also
be a mayor, regardless of the size of
their municipality (D T, 9 March 2000,
19). The validity of the organic law
was confirmed on 30 March by the
French constitutional council. This
decision was cause for relief on both
sides of politics, as the notion of may-
ors being unable to act as ministers
would have been viewed as pure
heresy.
In practice the limit on mandates
meant that Flosse was obliged to give
up one of his three offices, and he
resigned from the least important one
of mayor on 10 March, albeit with
some sentimental regret. Pirae was the
launching pad for his career in poli-
tics after he won the municipal elec-
tions in 1963 and he has held the
office of mayor with comfortable
majorities ever since. Unwilling to let
his beloved Pirae leave the family f o l d ,
Flosse effected an orderly dynastic
succession for his son-in-law, Edouard
Fritch, who is also deputy leader of
Tahoeraa and a government minister.
The process began with a by-election
on 9 April to replace four deceased
municipal councillors. Due to the
short notice, and also the awareness
that their chances were slim in this
staunchly pro-Flosse electorate, the
territorial opposition declined to field
candidates. Tahoeraa’s four chosen
women candidates were elected unop-
posed, and the reconstituted council
elected Fritch as mayor of Pirae on 13
April. Fritch thus has a year in which
to make a positive impression on the
electorate before they judge him at
the ballot box. As a result of Flosse’s
enthusiasm for architectural legacies,
Fritch also inherited a project to con-
struct a fabulous new town hall at a
cost of f c f p800 million. The cost of
construction is being split roughly
three ways between the municipality,
the territory, and the French state
( Jean-Marie Frebault, premier adjoint,
Pirae).
Unfortunately for Gaston Flosse,
all these efforts to sustain his political
empire could come to nought if the
convictions against him for corrup-
tion are confirmed by appeals to the
highest courts in Paris. In October a
trial began, eight years after the so-
called Hombo affair in which Flosse
and his colleagues turned a blind eye
to the operation of an illegal casino in
return for an estimated f c f p30 mil-
lion donation to the Tahoeraa party’s
coffers. The judgment on 24 Novem-
ber convicted Flosse (and others) of
passive corruption and complicity in
allowing an illegal gambling house.
The president received a two-year sus-
political reviews • poly n e s i a 231
pended prison sentence, an f c f p1.8
million fine, and, significantly, one
year of ineligibility for public office.
Despite calls by the opposition for
him to resign immediately, Flosse
refused and signaled his intention to
stay in office until the appeal process
was concluded. As the appeal could
take up to two years, this may allow
Flosse to campaign on behalf of Taho-
eraa for the 2001 elections before his
fate is decided. Flosse’s participation
could be crucial if Tahoeraa is to hold
any hope of staying in government
once the electoral system is adjusted
to a more level playing field. The
party faithful stood by Flosse, giving
him a hero’s welcome when he
returned to Tahiti from the trial and
reelected him president of the party in
their annual congress in December
(TP, Nov 1999, 10–11; Dec 1999, 10).
In another trial in February, Flosse
was convicted for having accepted
thirteen free flights with the Oceania
airline in return for making that com-
pany the government’s exclusive car-
rier for official business. His penalty
was an eight-month suspended prison
sentence, f c f p2.73 million fine, but
no removal of civic rights. In effect,
he would be left with a clean record
after paying the fine, and for that rea-
son Flosse and his lawyer considered
the verdict a good outcome and did
not seek appeal (TP, Feb 2000, 7–8).
In yet another court case concerning
Flosse, but one in which he was not
personally charged, his highest-level
staff were convicted in November for
having stolen files from the office of
an opposition lawyer. The three con-
victed men remain in the employ of
the presidency.
The wheels of justice turn slowly
because of a law that requires the tri-
als of territorial politicians to be relo-
cated to metropolitan France. Never-
theless, the law finally caught up with
former president Alexandre Léontieff.
In the year under review his convic-
tions were confirmed in three separate
c o u rt cases. In the first instance, L é o n-
t i e ff ’s right to appeal his conviction in
the Cardela Clinic affair was rejected,
and his one-year prison sentence was
confirmed for taking a bribe in return
for writing off the clinic’s tax bill.
Léontieff thus assumed the dubious
distinction of being the first territorial
politician imprisoned since the late
1950s. He began serving time in Sep-
tember. In the second case, Léontieff ’s
conviction was confirmed in the
appeals court for receiving a $1 mil-
lion commission from a Japanese
developer in return for approving the
c o n s t ruction of a hotel and g o lf c o u r s e
in Moorea. He received another three-
year prison sentence (one year sus-
pended). In a similar case, the appeals
c o u rt confirmed Léontieff ’s conviction
for the Meridien Hotel affair with
another three-year prison sentence
(two years suspended). All the penal-
ties included weighty fines and priva-
tion of civic rights (TP, O ct 1999, 7, 13;
April 2000, 13). Léontieff must have
a very good lawyer, for by May he
had already been released from prison
under special conditions, and he
resumed working as a strategist for
the Tavini opposition.
President Flosse has clearly taken
to heart the dictum of circus for the
masses if the events of late June are
anything to go by. Flosse officially
opened a new entertainment venue
(27 June), opened his new presidential
offices to the public (28 June), inau-
gurated the territory’s own television
station, and celebrated autonomy day
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on 29 June. The date chosen by Flosse
for autonomy day is scorned by the
opposition as it marks Tahiti’s annex-
ation by France in 1880 and bears no
relation to milestones in the territory’s
evolving status of autonomy. The
opposition also hounded the president
over the cost of his new presidential
palais. It was initially budgeted at
f c f p1 billion, but was completed two
years late, and the final cost of con-
struction blew out to 3.5 billion (of
which the state paid 600 million),
although the opposition believes its
real cost to be much higher (Assembly
debate, 8 June 2000). It is an ornate
European-style building, similar to the
existing Pape‘ete and forthcoming
Pirae town halls, and much of the
interior was decorated by master
craftsmen brought in from France.
Flosse’s demi origins lean toward his
French side in architectural taste and
other aesthetic choices, such as the
new mock-gas streetlights on the
waterfront mimicking those on the
Champs Élysées in Paris.
As with most developments of any
publicity value, the president was per-
sonally involved in the construction of
the new outdoor entertainment venue,
which was built in record time by his
Polynesian Intervention Group. The
To‘ata place, on the Pape‘ete seafront,
was consecrated with a fabulous tradi-
tional ceremony with over a thousand
performing artists participating, but
the official opening gesture fell to a
barefoot President Flosse. To‘ata will
be the venue for the annual cultural
festival. In an interesting shift, t h i s
festival, long known as the Ti u r a i ,
then in recent years as the Heiva, 
now appears to be undergoing
another name change—this year the
press referred to it as Tahiti Nui 2000
(D T and NT, 27 and 28 June 2000).
Tahiti Nui is the president’s preferred
name for the territory as a whole,
though not one officially recognized
by France. Nevertheless, he has pro-
ceeded to stamp this name on all new
entities, including the airline, Tahiti
Nui Satellite service, and Tahiti Nui
Television (t n t v), both of which were
launched symbolically on autonomy
day.
In view of the official energy and
taxpayers’ funds devoted to setting up
Tahiti Nui Television, analysis is war-
ranted to discern the political motiva-
tions behind it. The president has
become increasingly intolerant of crit-
icism from any quarters, including the
media. Flosse finds no fault in the cov-
erage of the two daily newspapers
which are owned by the right-wing
media magnate Hersant. However, the
monthly Tahiti Pacifique has been a
constant source of irritation, as has
Radio Tefana, run by the Tavini oppo-
sition. Although the television satellite
station Canal Polynésie has been
favorable to the government, no doubt
because it has benefitted from gener-
ous subsidies, the same cannot be said
for other stations. Telefenua mainly
shows programs from abroad, but the
small percentage of its airtime given to
local current affairs has proven unac-
ceptable to the president, who charg e d
it with being indépendentiste. Mem-
bers of the government are forbidden
to appear on the station, and the gov-
ernment mounted an unsuccessful
legal challenge to take Telefenua off
the air. The two French state televi-
sion stations and their counterparts in
radio (r f o) have become more bal-
anced in their reporting of current
affairs since they were admonished by
the court for being biased in favor of
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the government during the last elec-
tion campaign. r f o’s newfound neu-
trality has angered the president, who
accused them of trying to “massacre
our majority” (TP, Feb 2000, 24–26).
The ostensible objective of Tahiti Nui
Television is to promote Tahitian cul-
ture and indigenous programs, while
the other stations show mainly
imported programs; however the con-
text just described suggests other fac-
tors were at play in the government’s
decision.
The speed with which Tahiti Nui
Television was set up was nothing
short of remarkable. The territorial
assembly voted to create the quasi-
public enterprise on 17 March 2000.
Its initial starting capital was f c fp550
million, of which the government con-
tributed 85 percent, with the balance
made up by private shareholders. It 
is anticipated that the station could
break even financially by the year
2005, but only if it realizes its ambi-
tion of f c fp500 million per year from
advertising revenue—a tall order
given that this figure is only slightly
less than what rfo currently earns
from advertising (NT, 21 June 2000,
4–5). Although creating a territorial
television station is within the gov-
ernment’s powers, it was obliged to
obtain approval from the metropoli-
tan audiovisual council (Conseil
Superieur de l’Audiovisuel or c sa).
The council believed there were inade-
quate guarantees that pluralism would
be respected by Tahiti Nui Television,
and its approval was withheld until
such guarantees could be made. Evi-
dently the council was concerned at
the widely shared public perception
that Tahiti Nui Television was too
closely identified with the government
and its president. The audiovisual
council demanded less government
involvement in the board of Tahiti
Nui Television (that is, no ministers),
more openness about its shareholders
to prevent conflicts of interest, a mini-
mum local content of two hours a day,
and clarifications about the amount
and duration of public funding for the
station (NT, 15 June 2000, 3). These
conditions were subsequently agreed
to by Tahiti Nui Television in a con-
vention with the audiovisual council,
and the station received its permit to
go to air just a week before the much-
publicized opening at the end of June.
Just in case three local stations and
two satellite television stations were
not enough for a territory of 225,000
people, the government also launched
Tahiti Nui Satellite, a territory-wide
diffusion of another dozen satellite
television channels and I n t e rnet access.
This subsidized competition is likely
to ruin the privately run Telefenua.
The fortunes of the new territorial
airline, Air Tahiti Nui, have been
mixed to date. There have been
repeated increases in the government’s
contribution to the capital of the air-
line, including allocations from the
president’s own special funds to tide it
over financial difficulties.
Originally the assembly had voted
to limit government participation to
10 percent, but later it removed this
restriction, and by March 2000 total
public participation via various gov-
ernment agencies exceeded 50 percent
and totaled f c f p1.6 billion. In 1999
the company succeeded in filling an
average of 52 percent of seats on its
Los Angeles route and 62 percent on
its Tokyo route. (A new route is
planned for Osaka.) It also undertook
numerous charter flights throughout
the Pacific Islands that were largely
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subsidized by the territory. Notably,
12 percent of passengers on the Los
Angeles route did not pay for their
tickets. Overall, in 1999 Air Tahiti
Nui lost f c f p1.2 billion, which was
400 million greater than initial predic-
tions (TP, April 2000, 9).
Tahiti Nui Television and Air Tahiti
Nui are just the latest additions in a
long list of quasi-public enterprises
(sociétés d’économie mixtes) in which
the territorial government is often the
majority shareholder. Others include
s e p rubbish disposal, t ep energy,
setil airports and construction, the
president’s versatile band of workers
on special projects—the Polynesian
Intervention Group, the Internet oper-
ation Project m e tu@, and the com-
mercialization of various activities 
by the post and telecommunications
office and the housing office. Many of
these initiatives have been made possi-
ble with the post-cep development
funds provided by France to transform
the territorial economy. The quasi-
public enterprises have contributed 
to economic growth, the provision 
of employment, and, in some cases, 
to the improvement of essential ser-
vices. Yet the trend for the govern-
ment’s increasing involvement in these
enterprises does pose cause for con-
cern. They are set up with public
monies, but in many instances there is
no guarantee they will e v er b re ak e v e n ,
much less make a profit. Subsidizing
their operations is likely to constitute
a continuing drain on territorial rev-
enue. Another problem is that the
position of president of such a com-
pany is often used as a payoff to poli-
ticians loyal to the incumbent govern-
ment, so the president may not be
chosen on the grounds of merit. In
addition to their lucrative salaries,
several politicians heading quasi-pub-
lic enterprises have engaged in corrup-
tion.
Nevertheless, the short to medium
term economic outlook is rosy for the
government. The pearl-culture sector
has continued its impressive perfor-
mance and accounts for more than
half the territory’s total exports. In
1988 French Polynesia exported only
440 kilograms of black pearls, but by
1999 it had reached a new record of
over 8,000 kilograms in exports (a 40
percent increase over the previous
year) at an estimated value of f c f p22
billion. Tahitian black pearls now
account for over 30 percent of the
world market (D I X I T 2000, 210).
Apart from the improved quality 
and quantity of local production, the
remarkable increase in market share
can be attributed to a plague wiping
out a large part of the Japanese pearl
industry since the mid-1990s. The
tourism sector also continued its
steady growth, finally attaining the
magical figure of 200,000 tourists in
1999, which was nevertheless short
of the government’s ambitious predic-
tions.
A report by the Bank of Hawaii
indicated several positive trends in the
economy (Osman 1999). It noted that
French Polynesia has developed an
advanced physical, social, and finan-
cial infrastructure that is second to
none compared to its Pacific Island
neighbors. After a slump in 1995 and
1996 associated with the nuclear test
resumption, French Polynesia’s econ-
omy recovered strongly from 1997 to
1999, mainly due to a construction
boom relating to public works and
hotels on Tahiti. This growth in turn
was largely funded by transfers fro m
t h e F rench state, including f c f p18
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billion per year to promote a con-
version of the economy in the post–
nuclear-test era. Given that this extra-
ordinary development assistance from
the state is scheduled to conclude in
2005, the government will have to
find other sources of revenue or
reduce its programs. For the time
being, economic growth is set to con-
tinue and will stand the Tahoeraa
party in good stead for its electoral
campaign.
It is still too early to make firm
predictions about the 2001 territorial
elections, but preliminary analysis and
speculation are in order. The fact that
the government did not achieve the
status of overseas country for French
Polynesia may not be very significant
in electoral terms. The public is
noticeably weary of repeated reforms
to the statute, which have often been
bigger on symbolism than substance.
Of far greater import is the French
government’s preparedness to adjust
electoral boundaries in favor of Tahiti
and thereby advantage the urban-
based opposition parties. The new-
found unity of the opposition also
warrants attention in this context. All
the opposition’s leading lights, with
the exception of Boris Léontieff, have
now come together in a pro-indepen-
dence coalition dominated by Tavini.
As a result of the moderating influ-
ence of these new members (notably
Alexandre Léontieff, who is a key
party strategist) Tavini’s platform has
shifted to the center gro u n d . The part y
has abandoned its antagonistic stance
toward France and envisages a long-
term relationship of cooperation, even
after the territory accedes to indepen-
dence. The erstwhile threat of a rup-
ture of ties, and therefore economic
sacrifice, has been removed. New
Caledonia’s chosen path also suggests
the scope for a gradual transition to
independence. The socialist party in
Paris appears receptive to such moves
by French Polynesia and has entered
into dialogue with the territorial oppo-
s i t i o n . For all these reasons Tavini has
acquired greater mainstream credibil-
ity as an alternative government. In
contrast to every territorial election
held since 1982, the Tahoeraa party is
acutely aware that the outcome of the
next poll is by no means a foregone
conclusion.
karin von stro k i rc h
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Ma¯ori Issues
In 1996 Mori deserted the Labour
party and gave all the Mori seats to
the Mori-led New Zealand First
party. In 1999 they returned them all
to Labour thus ensuring a Labour-led
g o v e rn m e n t. The basic error N e w Z e a-
land First made was to enter a coali-
tion with the National party against
the clearly expressed wishes of Mori.
Now that Mori are starting to
become a political force in Aotearoa/
New Zealand, governments are hav-
ing to learn quickly to shed the deeply
ingrained habit of ignoring and dis-
missing  issues. With the gap between
Mori and non-Mori widening for
every socioeconomic indicator, Mori
looked to Labour to restore some
semblance of justice. On election night
in November 1999 new Prime Minis-
ter Helen Clark thanked Mori for
returning all the Mori electorates to
Labour. Mori then waited to see
what Labour would return to Mori.
The first indication that the prime
minister was serious about Mori
issues came with the appointment of
three associate ministers to assist the
minister of Mori Affairs. It soon
became obvious however that the min-
i s t e r, Dover Samuels, was a political
liability. First he gave the prime minis-
ter bad advice on how to conduct
Waitangi Day. Then he was embroiled
in an employment dispute with his
press secretary. When he became prey
to what were eventually unproved
allegations of sexual impropriety 
from the right-wing act party in June
2000, the prime minister removed his
warrant. Soon after, several convic-
tions for violence and theft came to
light that Samuels had not declared to
the Labour party. Having watched the
minister of Mori Affairs in the previ-
ous government spending more time
fending off right-wing attacks than
doing his job, Mori were not unsym-
pathetic to the prime minister’s deci-
sion. Dover Samuels was replaced by
first-term member Parekura Horomia,
a career bureaucrat with a strong
preference for maintaining a low
public profile.
The prime minister had indicated
her lack of confidence in Dover Sam-
uels long before she removed his war-
rant. In January she set up the Cabi-
net Committee on Closing the Gaps
(between Mori and non-Mori) and
decided to chair it herself. Samuels
admitted that he was unable to make
headway with many heads of govern-
ment departments and that they were
less likely to disregard the prime min-
ister. One of the first decisions of the
cabinet committee was to give the
Ministry for Mori Development
greater powers to conduct account-
ability audits on all government agen-
cies. Negative reactions from the
opposition benches indicated that the
ministry is almost certainly going to
continue having difficulty accessing
information from other government
agencies that resent having to account
for what they are, or more likely, are
not doing for Mori.
The usual opposition tactic for
ensuring that Mori needs are not
addressed is to keep up personal
attacks on Mori members of the
House. After the 1999 election the
main target was John Tamihere, the
flamboyant member for the new Hau-
raki electorate. Helen Clark had
backed his selection as the Labour
candidate for the seat, rejecting the
Mori selection. Prior to the election
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Tamihere had been the chief executive
officer of an urban Mori corpora-
tion, the Waipereira Trust, which
operates from West Auckland.
The right-wing opposition party
act, using information fed to it by
disgruntled Mori in West Auckland,
forced an inquiry into the Trust’s use
of public funds. Tamihere’s inexperi-
ence in the House showed in the early
stages of the inquiry as he named and
attacked members of the Waipereira
Trust, whom he accused of leaking
information to act. Their vehement
denials forced Tamihere to apologize.
Although the Trust was cleared of
specific allegations, act continued to
needle Tamihere about its operations
and his own conduct.
Given parliament’s and the media’s
recent history of attacking Mori
members personally, it is not surpris-
ing that the fourteen other M  o r i w h o
entered or were returned to parlia-
ment in November have maintained a
low profile in both the House and the
media. Despite this, some, such as
Tariana Turia, have been able to make
important changes that directly bene-
fit Mori. However, given the strongly
anglocentric nature of the New Zea-
land parliament, the job of achieving
the attitudinal changes needed both 
in and outside the House, if any real
progress for Mori is to be achieved,
will fall largely to non-Mori mem-
bers and ministers, such as the prime
minister and the minister in charge of
Treaty of Waitangi negotiations. It
was a welcome change for the prime
minister to acknowledge the racism
against Mori that is deeply ingrained
in the New Zealand Police after the
shooting of a M  o r i university student
in Waitara in April. Mori have
repeatedly raised this issue over many
decades but have always been ignore d .
Minister in Charge of Treaty of
Waitangi Negotiations Margaret Wil-
son is a close ally of the prime minis-
ter. The ex-professor of law at Wai-
kato University learnt quickly not to
rely on Dover Samuels for advice on
how to settle claims. She chose instead
to develop her own direct relation-
ships with claimants. In her first six
months in office Wilson demonstrated
a willingness to meet with claimant
groups in their own territories, a wel-
come change from the previous minis-
ter. She was also prepared to listen to
all claimants, regardless of represen-
tation disputes, and to work closely
with the different social groupings of
whanau, hapu, and iwi. This angered
the elite group of Mori who have
stalked the halls of parliament for
decades and succeeded in negotiating
deals and settlements without consult-
ing those they claimed to represent.
The deals, such as the infamous fish-
eries settlement (the Sealords deal),
have almost all turned sour, and
ensured that claimants will re-litigate
them. The fresh approach by the new
minister aims to achieve durable set-
tlements, and to deliver the benefits to
whanau, hapu, and iwi on the gro u n d ,
bypassing the elite group who have
c o m m a n d e e red settlements in the past.
It remains to be seen whether the new
minister has the political capability to
outsmart these very experienced oper-
ators and return the benefits of settle-
ments to those most in need of them.
It also remains to be seen whether her
f resh approach signals any real change
in the attitude of the Crown, or
whether she is simply undertaking a
sorely needed public relations exercise
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in order to achieve the same ends as
the previous government.
The statement of principles for set-
tling claims issued in June 2 0 0 0 by the
minister indicated that areas of con-
cern remain for the settlement pro c e s s .
These are mainly in respect of her
statement that lands administered 
by the Department of Conservation
(almost a third of the country) would
not generally be available for settle-
ment and that the Crown would re t a i n
title to natural resources including
petroleum, minerals, and geothermal
resources. She also intends to review
the Treaty of Waitangi Act, the legis-
lation that determines the operation
of the Waitangi Tribunal. It is widely
believed that she will use the review
to attempt to remove the tribunal’s
powers to make binding recommen-
dations. If she does, her principle of
repairing and reestablishing the shat-
tered relationship between Mori and
Crown will fail.
Settlements entered into by the pre-
vious government continued be prob-
lematic, although the nz$170 million
Ngai Tahu settlement has been able 
to return benefits for that iwi. Their
chief negotiator, Sir Tipene O’Regan,
took graceful retirement as the next
generation moved in to administer
and maximize the tribe’s benefits from
the settlement. Apart from the griev-
ances of one hapu and a few minor
upsets as the tribe’s administration
determined the best combination of
skills and experience needed to take
the tribe into the new millennium,
proceeds from the settlements appear
to have set Ngai Tahu well on the
path to social, economic, and cultural
recovery.
Tainui, on the other hand, which
also received a nz$170 million settle-
ment, has suffered serious setbacks,
making huge losses on several unwise
investments and being forced to sell
off reserved land to meet its debts.
Internal discord had simmered for
several years, as hapu who were dis-
enfranchised by the settlement warned
of impending disaster. Tainui’s chief
negotiator, Sir Robert Mahuta,
became embroiled in very public
slanging matches with his detractors,
and refused to stand down in spite of
ill health. Even the highly regarded
kingitanga (the ruling elite of Tainui
of whom Sir Robert is a member)
came under attack. As with almost all
of the problematic settlements, those
who have derived the greatest benefit
appear to be a select handful of well-
paid consultants and lawyers. Calls
on the government to intervene have,
as always, been ignored, despite their
obvious involvement in creating the
chaos in the first place.
The allocation of fisheries assets
from the Sealords deal continues to 
be held up in the courts. Although 76
percent of traditional iwi representing
63 percent of all Mori have sup-
ported the allocation model proposed
by the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries
Commission, urban Mori corpora-
tions and other groups not recognized
as iwi have continued to use the
courts to delay the allocation. In May
a group of twenty-five iwi released 
an independent report showing that
Mori were losing over one million
dollars per month as a result of the
delays. They were calling for the gov-
ernment to legislate to allow the
immediate allocation of the assets.
Mori have continued to battle the
government to stop them allocating
parts of the radio spectrum without
providing for the Mori interest in
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them. In 1999 the Waitangi Tribunal
upheld the claim by Mori to the
radio waves. In its report it strongly
criticized the Crown for failing to
respond to repeated warnings from
Mori, the courts, and the Privy
Council that denying Mori access to
a significant role in radio, television,
and communications would be
extremely damaging for the Mori
language. The Crown is obliged under
the Treaty of Waitangi and its own
legislation to protect the Mori lan-
guage. In March the government
agreed to sell to Mori, at a 5 percent
discount, a parcel of the 3g spectrum
(needed for the application of new
generation cellphones and data trans-
fer technology). They continued to
refuse to allocate to Mori any of the
2g spectrum needed for mobile tele-
phone services, claiming it had all
been allocated. The New Zealand
Mori Council has lost its cases
against the Crown in the High Court
and the Court of Appeal over the
allocations of the radio spectrum and
is now taking the matter back to the
Privy Council. 
Mori have maintained for some
time now that the only way they will
be treated fairly in their own country
is if there are constitutional changes.
The previous government forbade any
discussion on this issue. In April the
new government and the Institute for
Policy Studies at Victoria University
of Wellington hosted a conference
entitled Building a Constitution. New
Zealand has no written constitution.
The only document that qualifies for
that status is the Treaty of Waitangi.
Although the conference was by invi-
tation only, and was attended mainly
by parliamentarians, the judiciary, the
legal profession, and academics, sev-
eral of Moridom’s strongest advo-
cates for the entrenchment of the
treaty in a constitution attended and
presented practical proposals for
advancing debate on the constitution.
A very wide range of views were pre-
sented, and, predictably, there was no
consensus. However, there was sup-
port for the establishment of two
constitutional commissions, one for
Mori and one for non-Mori. Fol-
lowing the conference the prime min-
ister commented that she did not
consider there was any compelling
demand to do anything. Although her
comments were disappointing, they
did signal some progress toward offi-
cial recognition of the true status of
Mori in Aotearoa / New Zealand.
m argaret mutu
N i u e
Serious threats to Premier Sani Laka-
tani’s political and personal health
occurred during his first eighteen
months in office. In August 1999 he
was hospitalized in Auckland and
subsequently underwent a double
bypass heart operation. Lakatani’s
health problems may have been com-
plicated by stress over his plans to
introduce a new air service, which
was to have been known as Coral Air.
While Lakatani survived his hospital
ordeal, the Coral Air venture was not
so fortunate.
The purpose of the arrangement
with Coral Air was to generate addi-
tional tourist revenue for Niue, as the
island is virtually tourist-free most of
the time, and the larger share of its
accommodation properties are usually
empty. The Coral Air project was crit-
icized by an independent group of
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consultants hired to evaluate the pro-
ject by the New Zealand government,
which then proved unwilling to assist
Niue with financial support for the
scheme. The airline was to have had
several aircraft and a staff of eleven
pilots and copilots. With the entire
financial risk guaranteed by the Niue
government, the plan for the airline
was described by the consultants as
“imprudent and reckless.” Ultimately
both the Niue government and Coral
Air accused one another of failing to
meet contractual commitments, and
the entire matter has been placed
before the courts. It seems unlikely
that any arrangement with Coral Air
will contribute to the rejuvenation of
Niue’s tourist industry, which seems
to thrive only when South Pacific
regional conferences happen to be
held on the island. Indeed, the best
that the Niue government can now
hope for from its involvement with
Coral Air is that the airline’s threat to
sue for $20 million—more or less the
island’s total annual budget—as com-
pensation for an alleged breach of
agreement and for lost business reve-
nue w i ll also fail to get off the gro u n d .
Some members of the Niue Assem-
bly were doubtful from the outset
about the government’s plans for
Coral Air. Their concerns began with
the payment of a loan from the gov-
ernment to the airline. As a result, in
late 1999, with the premier still recu-
perating in an Auckland hospital, a
group of assembly members, includ-
ing an associate minister, began
maneuvering to replace him.
When it took office in early 1999,
the Niue People’s Party (n p p) held a
majority of 14 to 6 in the Assembly
through support from a group of
independents. By December, however,
it seemed as though the government—
the island’s first political party admin-
istration—would also be Niue’s first
to lose office on an assembly motion
of no confidence. 
The initial source of discontent
with Lakatani appears to have been
the commitment to Coral Air. Prior to
the vote, Lakatani indicated somewhat
ironically that he would call a new
election rather than govern with a
10–10 “hung Parliament”—the result
that the party itself had inflicted on
Lakatani’s predecessor, Frank Lui,
prior to the 1996 election. In the
event, however, the no-confidence
vote, taken on 17 December 1999,
found the Niue People’s Party desert e d
by the independents who had origi-
nally given it their support, and the
result was precisely the 10–10 out-
come against which Lakatani had
warned.
The vote itself proved somewhat
chaotic, with some confusion about
the voting procedure and a decision
by elected npp Speaker Tama Posi-
mani forbidding debate, leaving the
grounds for the no-confidence motion
at least formally undisclosed. Follow-
ing the vote, not only was there no
prime ministerial resignation, but a
statement was made looking toward
a number of major projects, including
a n z$50 million golf resort and con-
struction of a series of wind genera-
tors for electricity supply.
Afterward, independent assembly
members unsuccessfully filed for a
judicial review of the assembly proce-
dure for the vote. This was followed
by a walkout of eleven members, pre-
venting further assembly business
from being undertaken. The numbers
demonstrated that a majority of mem-
bers was now in opposition to the
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Lakatani government, leaving it
unable to pass legislation or, unless
circumstances change, to enact a bud-
get. A new motion of no confidence,
filed by former minister of finance
Terry Coe, was not accepted by the
Speaker, whose own rulings have also
now become a subject of controversy.
Opposition members of the Assembly
now want the Speaker to be replaced,
on the grounds of political bias and
because of a series of decisions
restricting members’ questions,
motions, and assembly debate. The
departure of the eleven members was
in some ways therefore an expression
of no confidence in the Speaker and
his rulings, as well as in Lakatani and
his government.
Accordingly, Niue’s own year-2000
problem proved to be a minority gov-
ernment, moreover, one facing a sub-
stantial deficit as well as a somewhat
weary and unsympathetic larger par t-
ner, New Zealand. Reductions contin-
ued in New Zealand aid—with a fur-
ther drop of n z$2 5 0,0 0 0 in budgetary
assistance in 1999—and in the Niue
population. One study claims that by
2003 the number of residents will
have dropped to 1300, a decline of
about 100–150 each year. While the
Assembly contemplates votes of no-
confidence against the government,
Niue’s residents, it seems, continue—
by leaving—to display their own lack
of confidence in the island’s future
p ro s p e c t s .
The loss of support in the Assem-
bly could not have come at a worse
time for Lakatani. It occurred just
prior to his departure for Wellington
for discussions with new Minister of
Foreign Affairs Phil Goff, appointed
following the election in New Zealand
of a Labour-Alliance coalition govern-
ment in November 1999. Lakatani
had been invited with the rest of his
cabinet to Wellington for talks about
Niue’s social and economic problems.
The agenda included the future of
Niue’s constitutional ties to New Zea-
land, the need for better air services,
Niue’s alleged involvement in offshore
banking fraud, and continuing levels
of New Zealand financial aid. The
New Zealand government appears to
support several “reform” measures,
including the establishment of a Niue
Trust Fund to assist with financial
management, introduction of a goods
and services tax to replace personal
and company taxation, and a long-
term national strategic development
plan (of which, however, there have 
in the past been several, all of them
hopeful, none of them effective)
involving greater support for the
private sector.
The talks between Niuean and New
Zealand officials built on a New Zea-
land review of its development assis-
tance to Niue, published as Develop-
ing a Sustainable Private Sector. The
report criticized successive Niue gov-
ernments for failing to adopt eco-
nomic reforms to reduce the size of
the public sector, stimulate private
businesses, and introduce new finan-
cial management systems. It went on
to identify Niue’s main problems as
loss of population, an excessively larg e
and dominant public sector (and a
correspondingly weak private sector),
and awkward land tenure issues.
Attention was also drawn to the fail-
ure of the Niue-Tuvalu immigration
program, begun in 1997, which has
led to only a handful of Tuvalu fami-
lies arriving, all of them living in one
village, Vaiea.
T he Niue govern m e n t ’s payments to
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Coral Air have also become a source
of concern for New Zealand. The
funds provided for Coral Air were in
contrast to the cabinet’s reluctance to
assist the island’s top hotel, the Mata-
vai Resort, which has now become
insolvent, notwithstanding the govern-
m e n t ’s substantial prior investment in
the property, in which it holds a 51-
percent share.
Some New Zealand officials,
unhappy with the absence of progress
toward financial self-sufficiency, want
to review the pivotal Constitution Act
1974, which commits New Zealand
to providing ongoing support for
Niue. If this were to be done, there
would appear to be only a limited
number of available political status
options: full independence (likely to
be resisted by Niue and by most
Niueans); continuation of the present
status, self-government in free associ-
ation, perhaps with reduced financial
support from New Zealand; and rein-
tegration into New Zealand. The last
would lead to abolition of the Niue
Assembly and the cabinet, and their
replacement by a local government
administration of some kind—an
unappealing prospect for Niue’s politi-
cians. The various options are to be
explored by a joint consultative group
composed of officials from Niue and
New Zealand. The New Zealand
three-person team includes the direc-
tor of the Foreign Ministry’s South
Pacific Division, an official from its
legal division, and a Treasury official.
While some New Zealand officials
may be contemplating weaker links to
Niue as a way of saving money, Niue-
ans can be expected to be vigilant
about safeguarding current constitu-
tional relationships guaranteeing citi-
zenship and at least a measure of
financial support. A 1991 review rec-
ommended that the present arrange-
ments for New Zealand citizenship
for Niueans be retained, but suggested
that a concept of “Niuean identity”
could be developed as a possible first
step toward Niuean citizenship. In
addition to the citizenship issue, the
government’s Constitution Review
Committee is considering the question
of control over Niue’s external affairs.
Its report is due to be presented dur-
ing 2000, first to the Assembly, and
then to the joint Niue–New Zealand
consultative group. 
Ti e s with New Zealand were b o u n d
to be affected by the change of gov-
ernment there. The election of a new
Labour-Alliance left-of-center admin-
istration has introduced a new set of
faces for Niue’s politicians to deal
with. Whether there will be changes
of policy, however, is another matter.
Not surprisingly, Lakatani prefers an
end to New Zealand’s recent practice
of reducing budgetary aid by
nz$250,000 each year. There are even
hopes of a reimbursement for previ-
ous reductions, totaling nz$1.25 mil-
lion, with the funding going toward
a 10 percent cost-of-living allowance
for the island’s 430 public servants. 
Niue’s ties to New Zealand are still
its most important—not only because
of the aid received from New Zealand,
or the access made possible by Niue-
ans’ possession of New Zealand citi-
zenship, but because of the ongoing
constitutional relationship that exists
between them. Premier Lakatani’s
plans to establish ties with China, for
instance, provoked a response from
then minister of foreign affairs Don
McKinnon that Niue would need to
consult with New Zealand before
establishing links with China or
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indeed any other country. Although
constitutionally correct, it is difficult
to understand why New Zealand
should have been in any way con-
cerned about a widening of Niue’s
international contacts. New Zealand
has its own ties with China—one of
its major trading partners—and any
assistance that could be provided by
China would in some way take pres-
sure off New Zealand as Niue’s main
donor country. Niue has also been
seeking aid from Taiwan and South
Korea. The possibility of the island
gaining aid from both Taiwan and
China was in itself, however, some-
what ambitious.
Despite uncertainty about the
future direction of the Niue–New
Zealand relationship, preparations
have begun for centennial celebrations
commemorating the connection. Niue
was proclaimed a British protectorate
in 1900 and on 11 June 1901 it was
formally annexed to what was then
the Dominion of New Zealand. At
that time, the population of Niue was
4,600: nearly a hundred years later,
there are about 1,700 people on the
island, a remarkable population
implosion ultimately attributable to
the island’s ties to New Zealand. At
present there are 517 occupied homes
on Niue. The village of Namukulu,
the island’s smallest, has only nine
households and twenty residents. The
capital, Alofi, has 655 people, a drop
of 77 since the 1997 census.
The government’s precarious hold
on power comes at a time when, iron-
ically, its political stability has been
identified as an important factor in a
major initiative and investment. An
agreement between the government
and the International Medical Educa-
tion Planning Committee, based in the
United States, has led to the establish-
ment of the Lord Liverpool University
George Washington School of Medi-
cine on Niue. The university, which is
not affiliated with any other similarly
named institution, is similar to other
such entities set up on Caribbean
islands. Niue’s reputation as a safe
and secure environment, politically
stable and free from international
conflict, seems to have attracted the
organizers to it. While it was expected
that about fifty students would attend
the first-year medical course, con-
tributing to Niue’s economy and, no
doubt, to its overall standard of med-
ical care, when the university opened
in May 2000 there were only about
fifteen students. Two places have been
set aside for Niuean graduates with a
BA or BSc degree. The medical school
is projecting a combined student and
teacher population of between six
hundred and a thousand people over
the next five years—a high pro p o rt i o n
of Niue’s total population and likely
to have a substantial impact on the
island, both economically and socially.
The courses offered are for medical
degrees recognized by Niue and by
the World Health Organization
(w h o). At its opening, the university
campus was located at what has been,
until recently, the Niue Hotel, where
there are to be lecture halls and a
medical library. According to the
medical school’s website, there are
plans for a permanent campus, with
“impressive buildings, interwoven
with the community,” to be built on
10 acres of land south of Alofi.
The Niue Hotel itself, twenty-five
years old, had been put up for sale by
the government. Although refurbished
at great expense following Cyclone
Ofa in 1991, the hotel has been expe-
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riencing poor occupancy rates for
some time and has been surpassed 
in quality by the equally beleaguered
Matavai Resort. With the opening of
the medical school, the hotel finally
ceased to function, the property hav-
ing been leased for at least three years
by the university.
At the same time, an overdue
upgrade is also being carried out at
Niue’s Lord Liverpool Hospital. The
renovation project, part of a larger
health-care program funded by New
Zealand’s Office of Development
Assistance, has been made possible
through w h o support. The Niuean
health service was also to benefit fro m
a new chiropractic service, based on
the university campus. 
Political changes in the Pacific
region have also had their effects on
Niue. All twenty-one Niuean students
at the University of the South Pacific
were evacuated from Suva following
the armed coup in May 2000, and
most flew on to New Zealand. Laka-
tani joined with other Pacific leaders
in condemning the Fiji coup attempt.
Subsequent developments in Fiji and
the Solomons gave Niue its own mini-
security scare. An apparent warning
to Lakatani, made on an I n t e rn et c h a t -
site, led to the provision of additional
security at both his home and office,
as well as a bodyguard for his travel
to New Zealand in June. That journ e y
culminated in a visit to the west Afri-
can state of Benin, where Niue’s
ongoing bid to broaden its interna-
tional ties was producing a further
and potentially significant success.
Lakatani was attending the European
Union–African, Caribbean, Pacific
(ac p) meeting, at which Niue succeed-
ing in gaining membership in the ac p
group prior to signing the Suva Con-
vention, the successor to the Lomé
Convention. Niue expects to gain
specialized aid and trade development
assistance from its formal relationship
with the European Union. Niue also
hopes to join the Asian Development
B a nk d u r i ng 2 0 0 0, re v e r s i n g t he b a nk’s
previous rejection of its application
and opening the way for further fund-
ing for a variety of development pro-
jects.
Despite its minority status, the
Lakatani government has continued its
“think big” approach to development,
p e rhaps in an attempt to demonstrate
to New Zealand that the island can at
some point achieve financial indepen-
dence. It is worth reflecting on the
scope and scale of what the Niue Cab-
inet has been seeking to achieve. Since
taking off i ce t h e re have been, as n o t e d ,
plans for a new airline (unsuccessful)
and the opening of a new medical
school (under way). But these are but
a few of the projects contemplated by
the cabinet. Others include a 3,000
a c re herbal medicine orc h a rd; a nz$50
million golf course; a nz$300 million
“cyber city”; a 150-room resort and
casino; the sale of residential estates
for retired Koreans eager for sea and
sun; another golf resort concept, to 
be developed by and for Australian
investors; a project for manufacturing
alternative energy units; and various
information technology proposals.
Perhaps the most imaginative of 
all these ventures is the “cyber city,”
which requires legislation setting up a
Niue Multi-Media City Authority. The
plan, promising n z$500,000 a month
royalties to the government, would
use hundreds of hectares of “indefi-
nitely leased land” to be administered
by a government-controlled authority,
which would in turn give a license to
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a corporation to operate the “cyber
city.” The project anticipates estab-
lishment of an Internet university
(20,000 students) as well as a facility
with two hundred companies engaged
in multi-media, information technol-
ogy, and research and development
activities. In addition to the projected
government rental income of n z$6
million annually, the scheme would
open up important new job opportu-
nities for skilled Niueans, some of
whom could perhaps be induced to
return “home” from New Zealand. A
public launch for the project has been
targeted for later in 2000.
The Niue People’s Party’s appeal—
like that of many populist parties
worldwide—has been based, in part,
on promises of financial largesse to
the less well-off. Some of these hopes
have already been achieved, account-
ing for the party’s continuing popular-
ity. There have been increases to pen-
sions as well as additional funding for
village councils and other organiza-
tions. The price has been high—a
substantial budget deficit, expected 
to reach about n z$1.5 million—as
spending has not been offset by
increases in revenue. The financial
shortfall may lead to a reduction in
public servants’ working hours (to a
four-day week).
Midway through 2000 the position
of the government remained precari-
ous at best. In June a motion support-
ing a request that Lakatani leave off i c e
failed on a 9–9 assembly vote. The
opposition had intended to move a
motion of no confidence—the second
in six months—but due to overseas
travel plans on the part of some
assembly members, the motion (which
would have required the Assembly to
reconvene at a later date) was with-
drawn. Lakatani has indicated, how-
ever, that he will not voluntarily
vacate an office which he waited a
long time to win, and he has re q u e s t e d
that there be no further discussion of
the idea. In any event the tied vote
prevented further assembly debate for
the moment. The request for Laka-
tani’s resignation was prompted by
continuing concern about Coral Air
and about some of the other plans 
to assist overseas developers with the
various resort and information tech-
nology projects.
Other, more unusual financial con-
cerns are also having an influence on
Niue’s political and economic affairs.
These developments raise questions
about the future of both the island
and its leader. Problems with Niue’s
international reputation took an
unexpected turn when it was included
on a blacklist of international tax
havens published by the g7 industrial
group of nations. The g7 report
named Niue as one of a group of
nations, many of them Pacific Island
states, failing to meet accepted criteria
against money laundering, including
the enforcement of regulations for
financial disclosure. The g7 group,
known as “the Financial Action Task
Force,” went so far as to caution
countries against making any trans-
actions with people and businesses in
blacklisted countries. 
Niue can ill aff o rd sanctions against
it for alleged money laundering. The
prospect of financial penalties has
been of concern to both the New Zea-
land and the Niue governments. Niue
maintains that it already has in place
stringent banking legislation and that
the entire matter arises out of some
s o rt of bizarre misunderstanding. Even
so, claims that Niue’s banking regula-
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t i o ns a re inadequate, and may be b e i n g
exploited for criminal purposes, are
likely to lead to some steps being
taken to close remaining loopholes.
On the other hand, it is possible that
by doing so it will remove some incen-
tives for depositors to lodge their
funds in Niue in the first place. There
are six offshore banks registered on
Niue—none of them physically pre-
sent on the island—as well as 4,800
international business companies reg-
istered for tax-haven benefits. 
The premier’s problems, perhaps
more imminent, stem from the likely
immediate effects of a failure for them
to be solved. His personal financial
position has led to the commencement
of bankruptcy proceedings over his
business dealings with a New Zea-
land–based company. The service of
bankruptcy papers arises out of Laka-
tani’s failure to repay a n z$30,000
debt to an Auckland businessman.
Once stamped and formally approved
by the court, service of the papers
would give the premier just fourteen
days to have judgment set aside or to
make a counter-claim. 
There are serious political implica-
tions if the bankruptcy proceedings
succeed. Lakatani—ironically Niue’s
minister of finance as well as its pre-
mier—faces disqualification from par-
liamentary office, and consequently
loss of his assembly seat and cabinet
position, if he is declared bankrupt.
This would be a novel contribution
by Niue to comparative political sci-
ence, adding “bankruptcy” and “non-
payment of debt” to the category of
instruments—coups, no-confidence
votes, election defeats, impeachments,
and assassinations—available for
replacing a head of government.
stephen levine
Sa¯m oa
The issue that made the most head-
lines in Smoa in the period from July
1999 to June 2000 was the murder 
of the minister of Public Works, the
Smoa Water Authority, and the Elec-
tric Power Corporation. Other impor-
tant issues included by-elections, the
electoral reform commission, the
Olympic sports dispute, and the
nurses’ strike.
Events of the night of Friday 16
July 1999 shocked the tiny Samoan
nation and the world. A ceremony to
mark the twentieth anniversary cele-
bration of the Human Rights Protec-
tion party (h r p p) was being held at
St Joseph’s College hall at Alafua,
about 10 minutes drive inland from
Apia. Minister Luagalau Leva‘ula
Kamu and Tuala Sale Tagaloa, Minis-
ter of Land, Survey and Environment,
were co-masters-of-ceremony. Luaga-
lau was shot at close range, a few min-
utes after introducing the prime minis-
t e r, as he walked to the back of the
stage to answer a cellular phone call
from a relative. He was fatally
wounded by a single shot from a .223
calibre rifle. At about eight o’clock,
he was taken to the national hospital,
where he died thirty minutes later (SO,
18 Jul 1999). Luagalau’s body was
laid to rest at his home in ‘Ululoloa 
on 22 July. Among the dignitaries
who attended the funeral were the
New Zealand members of parliament
Murray McCully and Tau Henare,
accompanied by the Samoan members
of the New Zealand parliament
Arthur Anae of the National party
and Phillip Field of the Labour party.
Smoa tried to come to terms with
its first political assassination in mod-
ern times. Well known as a peaceful
people who pride themselves in their
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culture, which they believed could
solve their differences through the
exercise of oratorical skills and wit,
Samoans found it difficult to believe
that the assassination of Luagalau had
taken place in their homeland. As one
Samoan wrote, “What is happening
to our country? What is happening to
the heart of Polynesia, the place that
we’ve been promoting as one of the
safest countries in the world? . . . I
grieve for Samoa” (SO, 21 Jul 1999).
Luagalau was educated in Smoa
before entering the University of
Hawai‘i where he graduated with a
master’s degree in political science. He
returned to Smoa and worked in the
foreign affairs section of the Prime
Minister’s Department before winning
a government scholarship to study for
a law degree at Auckland University
in New Zealand. He returned to
Smoa and established his own law
f i rm with his wife, who had graduated
with Master of Laws from the same
university. After a long involvement 
in various committees of the Human
Rights Protection party (hrpp), Lua-
galau won one of the two seats of
Slega constituency on Savai‘i Island
in the 1996 general elections. He was
appointed to the cabinet by the late
prime minister Tofilau Eti Alesana
and given the portfolios that he held
at the time of his death.
In the next few weeks, events
leading to Luagalau’s violent death
unfolded, and on 27 July, thirty-four-
year-old ‘Alatise was arrested and
charged with his murder (SO, 28 Jul
1999). ‘Alatise is a son of Le‘afa
Vitale, then incumbent minister of
women’s affairs. On 3 August, the
hrpp caucus dismissed To and Le‘afa
from the party (SO, 5 Aug 1999). Ear-
l i er t he same day, L e ‘ a fa’s a p p o i n t m e n t
as minister of women’s affairs was
terminated. On 4 August, sixty-seven-
year-old To Aukuso Cain, former
minister of Post Office and Telecom-
munication in the hrpp government,
was charg ed in c o n n e c t i on w i th L u a g a-
l a u ’s murder, and on 5 August, fifty-
six-year-old Le‘afa was also charged.
(SO, 6 Aug 1999).
E ffective from the same day, a secu-
rity system was instituted at the main
government building, which housed
most government departments. On 6
August, ‘Alatise admitted to the shoot-
ing of Luagalau in the supreme court
and was given a mandatory death sen-
tence. To and Le‘afa’s four-month
trial started on 17 January, and on 12
April, they were convicted of the same
crime and also received mandatory
death sentences. As the attorney gen-
eral explained in court “if other par-
ties were involved in aiding, abetting,
counseling, inciting to murder, they
too are equally responsible for the
crime” (quoted in SO, 18 Jan 2000).
On 10 May the head of state com-
muted all three sentences to life
imprisonment (SO, 13, 14 Apr 2000;
12 May 2000).
Evidence presented in court
revealed that To and Le‘afa had con-
spired to shoot Luagalau between 1
April and 16 July 1999 (SO, 18 Jan
2000). They ordered ‘Alatise to kill
Luagalau (SO, 23 Feb 2000) after Ene-
liko Visesio—To’s employee, whom
they had hired to do the deed—with-
drew. To and Le‘afa had also wanted
to murder other high-ranking govern-
ment officials. Le‘afa believed that the
prime minister, the minister of land,
survey and environment, and Luaga-
lau wanted to take land away from
him—a block of land behind the
hrpp headquarters at Mulinu‘u
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peninsula on which he had built a
nightclub and bar (S O, 1 8 Jan; 2 3 F e b
2 0 0 0). He was also angry that his
ministerial portfolios had changed
from Public Works, Electric Power
Corporation, and Smoa Water
Authority to Post Office and Te l e c o m-
munication, then changed again to
Wo m e n ’s A ff a i rs—a perceived demo-
tion from powerful portfolios to less
influential ones. To was unhappy
that his tree-felling contract with
Le‘afa had been terminated by Luaga-
lau. Both men were angry that the
same three ministers wanted to take
all their power away, among other
grievances (SO, 24 Feb 2000). The
chief justice was also on their list
because Le‘afa was unhappy at losing
a land and titles court hearing relating
to titles in his village, Malie, and
blamed the chief justice for it (SO, 18
Jan 2000; see also So‘o 2000, 241).
The murder trial drew strong
public reaction. One Catholic priest
blamed the assassination squarely on
the political party system, writing,
“[the] wisdom of the political party
system has now revealed its evil side
by the slaying of such a prominent
faipule [member of parliament] for
the sake of party power. . . . [T]his
foreign party politics is totally un-
Samoan. Where has party politics led
Smoa? By the look of events, straight
to hell” (SO, 31 Aug 1999).
The leader of the opposition S  m o a
National Development party (s n d p)
stated that the death of Luagalau was
an indication of serious corruption in
government departments. In his opin-
ion, Smoa should follow South Afri-
can President Nelson Mandela’s model
of a truth and reconciliation commis-
sion with wide-ranging powers to call
witnesses and gather documents. Only
then would it be possible to establish
the extent of corruption in Smoa. He
also referred to the sacked chief audi-
tor’s 1994 report, in which references
were made to corruption in high
places (SO, 17 Aug 1999). To testified
that the reason for the competition
among members of parliament to hold
the Public Works portfolio is “because
that is where the money is. That is
where you get the money under the
table” (SO, 26 Mar 2000). One writer
commented that the “naked greed of
selfish men went unchecked for too
long under this government and now
the country must bare its festering
wounds for all to see” (SO, 17 Aug
1999).
Because of the “naked greed of self-
ish men,” the same writer called for
the government to resign and advised
fellow Samoans to take responsibility
for their actions: “We vote with our
stomachs and not our consciences. We
vote on the basis of how well politi-
cians provide for us, not on the basis
of good policies, even less good char-
acter” (SO, 17 Aug 1999). The same
sentiment was echoed in parliament
by a senior member of the opposition
party. Fuimaono Mimio reasoned that
because there had been a murder dur-
ing the term of office of the present
administration, parliament should be
dissolved and new elections called.
Minister of Education Fiam Nomi
responded that there was no law
requiring the government to resign
(SO, 22 Aug 1999). On the issue of
corruption, Prime Minister Tuila‘epa
Sa‘ilele said that allegations that his
government was riddled with corrup-
tion came from opposition trouble-
makers desperate to get their hands on
p o w e r. “There are a lot of Opposit i o n -
i n s p i red allegations about corru p t i o n
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e t c, and the Opposition are doing their
own work to try and rubbish what the
Government is doing,” he told an
Auckland news re p o rt e r. “When we
took Government again in 1996 we
had in our own manifesto a strong
undertaking to proceed with the prin-
ciples of good government, specifically
relating to transparency and account-
ability regarding Government tenders.
[Luagalau] was one of those who was
very strong on transparency and tried
to ensure that the same transparency
applied to his own department” (SO,
12 Aug 1999). Tuila‘epa vowed to
continue with the anti-corruption
drive that cost Luagalau his life (SO,
12 Aug 1999).
The public had mixed reactions
when the head of state visited Le‘afa
and To in prison on 29 April 2000,
three weeks after they had been con-
victed. One eyewitness reported that
the visit “so touched the hearts of
prisoners that they wept when [the
head of state] arrived at Tafa‘igata
prison for an unexpected visit” (SO, 4
May 2000). If some prisoners appreci-
ated the visit, some members of the
public questioned its appropriateness.
Was it because the two men are for-
mer ministers? If so, why should they
be any different from other prisoners?
As one prisoner said, “In my whole
time I have spent in prison, nearly my
whole adult life, I haven’t seen or
heard of His Highness visiting prison-
ers” (SO, 4 May 2000). Did the head
of state’s visit mean that he sympa-
thized with the two former cabinet
ministers? More questions were asked
when after only two months in prison,
Le‘afa and To were allowed to spend
a weekend with their respective fami-
lies. They must have been allowed to
leave the prison without proper per-
mission, because they were with their
families for only two hours before
being taken back—at an order from
the prime minister. The police com-
missioner knew nothing about it, and
at the time of writing police were
investigating the release of the two
men (SO, 6 July 2000).
Luagalau’s parliamentary seat was
contested by two h r p p candidates,
two sndp candidates and one indepen-
dent. Independent candidate To‘omata
Alapati Po‘ese won the by-election on
19 September 1999 by 514 votes. The
two h r p p candidates, Loli Ioane and
Tuislega Sleni Farani, received 415
and 180 votes respectively. sndp can-
didates TapuaÔ Kelima and Alosm o a
Iosefa obtained 377 and 147 votes
respectively.
Despite having their membership 
in the Human Rights Protection party
terminated on 3 August 1999, Le‘afa
and To retained their parliamentary
seats until their conviction on 12 A p r i l
2000. Matatauali‘itia ‘Afa Les and
Leituala Tone Tu‘uaga were sworn
in to cabinet on 13 August 1999 to
replace the portfolios of Luagalau and
Le‘afa respectively (SO, 15 Aug 1999).
Both are in their first parliamentary
t e rms. By-elections were held in L e ‘ a f a
and To’s former constituencies on 23
June 2000. In Le‘afa’s constituency,
Sagaga-le-Usoga, of the two h r p p
candidates, Muagututagata Peter Ah
Him won with 631 votes to Fata
Pemila’s 574. Independent candidate
Fa‘amausili Faig gained 77 votes.
The other independent candidate
Tilino Pnaia II came last. In Faleata
West, h r p p candidate ‘Ulu Voml
‘Ulu Kini won To’s former seat with
571 votes; La‘ulu Dan Stanley (h r p p)
402; Leatiogie It‘au ‘Ale (a member
of the new Smoa National party,
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founded on 27 April 2000) 340;
Ma‘ilo Sio (independent) 16; and Oge
Mareko (independent) 55 (SO, 25 June
2000). In the constituency of åltaua
West’s second by-election after the
general elections of 1996, on 17
December 1999, another h r p p can-
didate, Ali‘imalemanu Fa‘al, was
reelected, giving the party a 36-seat
majority in parliament. The other 13
seats of parliament are occupied by 4
independents and 9 members of the
Smoa National Development party.
In åltaua West, a petition lodged by
s n d p candidate Nonumlo Faig led
to the disqualification by the court of
both his own candidacy and that of
Tua‘i‘aufa‘i Tafua‘upolu (SO, 16 Dec
1999).
With the 2001 general elections
only a few months away, the cabinet
appointed an Electoral Review Com-
mittee to look at the existing electoral
provisions and recommend changes; it
reported to parliament in the week of
10 April 2000 (SO, 13 Apr 2000). A
further government commission to
examine ways to improve the elec-
toral system tabled its report on 26
June 2000. Based on recommenda-
tions in both reports, the government
drafted amendments to the Electoral
Act of 1963. The Electoral Amend-
ment bill 2000 passed on 28 June.
Some of its proposed changes follow.
First, those intending to contest
parliamentary seats must reside in
Smoa for at least three years instead
of the existing one. (Those appointed
to international posts and their
spouses are exempt.) The govern-
ment’s view is that the administration,
control, and monitoring of Samoan
affairs should fall on Samoan citizens
living in Smoa. The one-year residen-
tial requirement does not permit accu-
rate assessment of the internal situa-
tion in the village, the constituency,
or the country (SO, 13 Apr 2000).
Samoans residing overseas criticized
the new residential provision, arguing
that their contribution to Smoa’s
economy through remittances was
sufficient justification to maintain the
status quo. Increasing the residential
requirement to three years makes it
difficult for them to contest parlia-
mentary seats (SO, 14 May 2000).
Second, the candidate nomination
fee increased from s t100 to s t300.
Third, the clerk of the legislative
assembly will no longer be the regis-
trar of electors and voters, or the
returning officer. The existing situa-
tion, where one person holds all three
positions, has received strong criti-
cism. Perhaps because the clerk of the
legislative assembly is a constitutional
appointment of the government, the
leader of the Smoa National Democ-
ratic party stated, “The Registrar is
blatantly partisan. The control of elec-
tions and registration of voters should
come under an independent and non-
partisan commission” (S O, 2 Feb
2000). The electoral reform commis-
sion agreed that the current “situation
has a negative impact on public per-
ception and assessment of probity in
the operation of the electoral registra-
tion system” (S O, 29 Jun 2000). The
commission also noted the legal
anomaly in making the clerk—who is
not a member of the public service—
responsible to the Public Service Com-
mission, and recommended that the
position of registrar of electors and
voters be placed in the Justice Depart-
ment under the direction of the secre-
tary for justice (S O, 29 Jun 2000).
Fourth, to have the right to chal-
lenge election results, unsuccessful
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candidates need to win only a mini-
mum of 25 percent of the votes won
by the successful candidate, instead of
the current 50 percent. The govern-
ment believes that the right to protest
against corrupt electoral practice is
important. As it stands the provision
can be read to encourage corruption
on a scale sufficiently large to elimi-
nate the possibility of achieving the
50 percent threshold. Moreover, it
defeats the purpose of justice in that
alleged transgression and violations 
of the law may be condoned by sheer
weight of numbers (S O, 29 Jun 2000).
Finally, the number of judges of 
the supreme court to hear an election
petition is increased from one to two.
The sports dispute made headlines
for about ten months, following alle-
gations of bribery of members of the
International Olympic Committee
(ioc), with which Smoa’s representa-
tive, Seiuli, was reportedly involved.
On 6 July 1999, shortly after the ioc
announcement that Smoa’s member-
ship was terminated, ioc Director-
General Francis Gerr a rd notified Seiuli
that he could no longer be a member
of S  m o a’s National Olympic Com-
mittee (snoc; S O, 1 2 December 1 9 9 9) .
Nor should he represent Smoa in the
Oceania National Olympic Commit-
tee meeting in Lausanne in October
1999 (S O, 21 Oct 1999).
Seiuli, president of both the Smoa
National Olympic Committee and the
Smoa Sports Federation (ssf), did
not step down from the presidency.
He wanted to stay on for another
year because of his role in organizing
the Smoa International Games in
May 2000 (S O, 22 Oct 1999). It was
revealed later that he also wanted to
stay on until an ssf audit was com-
pleted so that he could defend himself
if he had to (S O, 16 Dec 1999). As an
alternative, the executive board pro-
posed to split the organization in two:
The Smoa National Olympic Com-
mittee would be responsible for Olym-
pic sports while the Sports Federation
(sf) would handle non-Olympic
sports. Both bodies were to report to
the Smoa Sports Federation (S O, 12
Dec 1999). The meeting to split the
organization took place on 19 Octo-
ber 1999. It was intended that the
split would allow Seiuli to remain
involved in sports without being tied
to the Smoa National Olympic Com-
mittee (S O, 22 Oct 1999), thus avoid-
ing the ioc threat. What worried
sports administrators was that with
Seiuli still at the helm, the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee would not
only refuse Smoa’s entry to the Syd-
ney Olympic games in September
2000, but it might suspend annual
funding of about st500,000 to snoc-
ssf (S O, 22 Oct 1999). According to
Leao Akeripa, newly elected snoc
president, the push by the executive
board to split the mother organization
was the “basic cause” of the rift
between the two rival bodies. And it
was Seiuli who instigated the split
(S O, 12 Dec 1999). 
Other sports administrators did not
believe that splitting into two sports
bodies would remove the ioc threat.
As long as Seiuli was involved in the
Smoa International Games 2000, he
was also involved in Olympic sports.
Three of the main sports in the Smoa
games are Olympic sports. Two
attempts were made to move a vote of
no confidence in Seiuli and the execu-
tive board (S O, 22 Oct 1999), for rea-
sons that included the questionable
financial status of s n o c - s s f, the future
uncertainty of sports given the ioc
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threat, the push by the board to split
the organization, and Seiuli’s leader-
ship style (S O, 1 Dec 1999). Both
attempts failed. Seiuli in the chair
would not put the motion (S O, 3 Dec
1999). His supporters argued that
there was nothing in the constitution
that allowed such a motion. In the ssf
meeting on 30 November 1999, Leao
Akeripa was suspended, along with
two others who had by then been
elected as s n o c board members.
Seiuli eventually resigned from the
s s f presidency on 2 December 1999,
and Tuala Misi was elected to the
position. According to one s s f board
member, Seiuli had tendered his resig-
nation in late September 1 9 9 9, but the
board had asked him to stay on until
the “heat” between Smoa National
Olympic Committee and the Sports
Federation had died down (S O, 3 Dec
1999). At about the same time, Tole-
‘afoa Tautulu Roebeck, a s n o c board
member who was also the vice presi-
dent and a board member of Smoa
Sports Federation, tendered his resig-
nation to Leao. According to Tole-
‘afoa, he could not see the two bodies
working together. Ten Olympic sports
bodies indicated that they were also
defecting back to the Smoa Sports
Federation. They were joined by three
athletes who had already qualified to
compete in the Sydney Olympics (S O,
3 Dec 1999).
In a move the public welcomed, the
government stepped in when the dis-
pute worsened (S O, 27 Apr 2000). An
editorial in the Smoa Observer sug-
gested that “the government should
step in, dissolve the organisation and
save public resources from being
wasted” (S O, 3 Dec 1999). Conse-
q u e n t l y, Leota Lu II, minister of Yo u t h ,
Sports and Culture, stopped funding
from the Australian-based lottery
agency Tattslotto to the Smoa Sports
Federation (S O, 19 Dec 1999). The
lawyer Le‘aupepe Sanerivi became the
government-appointed mediator
whose task was to resolve the dispute.
After several unsuccessful attempts, a
meeting of the two rival bodies on 4
April came to a compromise. Tuala
Misi stepped down from the presi-
dency of the Sports Federation before
he and Leao Akeripa, president of
Smoa National Olympic Committee,
were reappointed president and vice
president respectively of the Interim
Committee under which the unified
sports organization called s n o c - s f is
administered. No vote was taken, as
the compromise between the two
presidents had been reached two days
before. The meeting of all sports bod-
ies simply endorsed their decision (S O,
5 Apr 2000). Afterward, the minister
of sports facilitated the release of
funds from Tattslotto to s n o c - s f
(S O, 13 Apr 2000).
On 18 April, the minister of sports
announced in a meeting with presi-
dents of local sports bodies that the
cabinet had unanimously called off
the Smoa games. The decision had
support in some sectors of the com-
munity (S O, 20 Apr; 2 May 2000). 
As the editor of the Smoa Observer
wrote, the “Prime Minister and his
cabinet did the right thing when they
cancelled the Smoa Games planned
for next month. . . . For that, they
deserve everyone’s congratulations,
and respect” (S O, 20 Apr 2000). The
cabinet’s decision reflected the lack of
general support in the Interim Com-
mittee. The government was probably
also uncertain about the ability of a
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s n o c - s f to fund the Smoa games,
which were to take place a few weeks
later (S O, 19 Apr 2000), and there was
no time to prepare for the games as
considerable time had been eaten
away by the dispute. The prospect 
of negative implications for Samoan
sports, and more particularly adminis-
trators, did not reverse the cabinet’s
decision.
The dispute worsened. The rival
organizations snoc and s n o c-sf not
only went their separate ways but
accused each other of causing the
deteriorating situation. Leao report-
edly tried to establish a new snoc-ssf
as the mother sports organization (S O,
24 May 2000). In turn, Tuala Misi
accused snoc of pretending to be the
old s n o c - s s f (S O, 28 May 2000).
Tuala also said that the establishment
of two bodies in the first place was
never approved by Smoa Sports Fed-
eration. Instead only snoc was to be
established and was to come under the
Smoa Sports Federation (S O, 16 Dec
1999). As the rift deteriorated, the
government stepped in to provide
leadership direction. In May, the sec-
retary of the Youths, Sports and Cul-
ture Department took over the admin-
istration of all sports ( S O, 22 June
2000). Some sections of the commu-
nity doubted the sincerity of the gov-
ernment’s motive in taking over. Leao
explained that standard i o c policy is
that it only recognizes S  m o a N a t i o n a l
Olympic Committee and not the gov-
ernment (S O, 28 May 2000). Some
thought that the government was sup-
porting the Sports Federation to the
disadvantage of the Smoa National
Olympic Committee. Sports Federa-
tion’s presidential candidate in the
election, to be chaired by the prime
minister on 6 July, to choose new offi-
cers for a new unified organization
was the prime minister’s brother-in-
law (S O, 25 June 2000). It became
clear that the public had lost confi-
dence in the Interim Committee.
Chaired by the prime minister, the
meeting of all sports bodies on 6 July
2000 elected Leao president of snoc-
sf along with new office holders and
committee members. The ten-month
dispute had finally ended, although
there are still murmurings of disap-
proval among some sports bodies,
including some s f members and their
presidential candidate, who boycotted
the elections (S O, 7 July 2000).
The Smoa Nurses Association
(s n a) has a reputation for bending the
will of the government to their favor
t h rough industrial action. Their strikes
in the 1 9 8 0s resulted in major changes
in the nursing and health administra-
tions. On 12 April 2000, they again
considered taking industrial action.
For four years, their representatives
had been negotiating a salary package
with government officials and had
p roposed a starting salary of s t12,000
for nurses with a Diploma of Nursing
(S O, 21 Apr 2000). The proposed fig-
ure was first dropped to s t10,000.
Later the Public Service Commission
agreed to the reduced figure of
s t9,000 (S O, 2 May 2000). However,
on 12 April 2000 the cabinet settled
for the figure of s t7,395 and decided
that their 5 percent pay increase
would be effective on 1 January 2001.
When the news was conveyed to the
association, its president, Mrs Fa‘a-
manatu Nielsen, was outspoken about
her unhappiness. Despite the dissatis-
faction expressed at the m e e t i n g
attended by 150 nurses, members of
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the executive board were able to talk
them out of immediate industrial
action.
Increasing the starting salary of
nurses who hold a Diploma of Nurs-
ing is one way to encourage qualified
nurses to remain in the serv i c e. A n n u a l
wages for enrolled nurses ranged from
s t2,000 to s t4,000 and for registered
nurses from s t6,000 to s t8,000.
Some retired nurses still receive
s t6,000 to s t7,000. One result of the
present financial troubles is an acute
shortage of nurses. Whereas the inter-
national ratio of nurses per patient is
one to three, in Smoa it is one to
twenty. According to Mrs Nielsen,
four hundred nurses are needed for
the service, but it could only employ
three hundred. Most of those who
have left for training and better
opportunities overseas were the young
ones. According to a lecturer in the
Faculty of Nursing of the National
University of Smoa, “You could only
do so much nowadays with a focus
on your livelihood. Nursing [must] be
marketed in a way [that those in the
service can] be proud of” (quoted in
SO, 21 Apr 2000).
When nothing came of attempts 
to have the government reconsider its
decision of 12 April 2000, the Smoa
Nurses Association resolved to strike
on 1 May 2000. All routine services
would cease except essential services
for obstetrics, the operating theatre,
the high dependency unit, and the
accident and emergency unit. Only a
skeleton staff would be provided for
emergency services. The strike was
intended to last for seven days pend-
ing a cabinet decision (S O, 23 April
2000). Negotiations continued until
Saturday 29 April, when a resolution
was reached. However, time was
needed to implement the agreement
The association also wanted it con-
firmed in writing. For these reasons,
amid much anger among the nurses
that their demands were not met in
time, the s n a executive persuaded its
members to postpone the strike until
Friday, 5 May. On that day, the strike
was called o ff. A l t h o u gh t h e ir d e m a n d s
were not met in full, the nurses were
content with the compro m i s e. D i p l o m a
graduates would still get a starting
salary of s t7,395. However, their pay
increase was backdated to 1 January
2000, not a year later as in the origi-
nal cabinet decision (S O, 5 May 2 0 0 0) .
The planned nurses’ strike had the
support of the Public Service Associa-
tion (psa) and the Smoa Trade Union
C o n g ress (s t u c), the umbrella of trade
unions in Smoa. On learning about
the planned strike, Su‘a Viliamu Sio,
s t u c secretary general, not only
assured the nurses of his organiza-
tion’s support, but immediately called
on other affiliated and friendly orga-
nizations to determine the best way
for all workers in Smoa to support
them (S O, 28 Apr 2000). Despite psa
support of the proposed s n a strike, it
was being criticized in some sectors of
the community. People asked why the
Public Service Association was not
pushing for better wages and salaries
for its members. One unhappy psa
member wrote, “Why is the psa not
fighting the government for better
wages and improved working condi-
tions, for all? Is it because the govern-
ment has allegedly given preferential
allocation of corporations board seats
to the psa? I think that for the better-
ment of the psa, all board seats
should be given back to government
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and the psa should decide on what
are its core functions and core
activities” (S O, 2 May 2000).
There was a call for the public to
support the nurses’ association. An
editorial in the Smoa Observer urged
that “If the strike goes on this Friday
[5 May], the nursing fraternity should
not be frowned upon as they have a
valid argument” (S O, 3 May 2000).
Commenting on the averted strike,
Minister of Health Misa Telefoni said,
“I defend any person’s right to strike.
It is a basic human right. The nurses
did what they felt they had to do in
the best interests of their members”
(S O, 7 May 2000). Misa’s comments
showed him as a man of principles,
except that they came after the strike
had been averted. The Public Service
Association, the Smoa Trade Union
Congress, Misa, and the public proba-
bly did not need to support the pro-
posed strike after all. With the general
elections early next year looming
large in the mind of the government,
it is almost certain that whatever set-
tlement it came up with would have
been agreeable to the nurses. As one
of the more experienced unions in the
country, the Smoa Nurses Associa-
tion knew when to make their wishes
known to the government.
asofou so‘o
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To k e l au
A Green Paper titled Tokelau Public
Service: To Preserve by Changing (ssc
1999), presented to the General Fono
in June 1999, proposed several mod-
els for changes in the public service.
Its major outcome was the prom o t i o n
of the Modern House of Tokelau pro-
ject (mht). The Modern House of
Tokelau concept dates back to 1 9 9 7
and 1998, when the Tokelau elected
leadership expressed a wish to “return
to the villages” as the main centers of
governance and administration. The
localization of all human and physical
resources would be included, as well
as management and administrative
structures. Promoted as “the recon-
structed house of Tokelau,” the pro-
ject is envisaged to encompass all
institutions and agencies, including
those previously considered “indepen-
dent,” making them accountable to
the Tokelau leadership.
Leading on from the “posts” iden-
tified in 1998, the year 2000 saw
commitment and efforts by Tokelau’s
leadership to continue with the build-
ing of this modern house. The New
Zealand government representatives
in these deliberations also expressed
their nation’s commitment to provid-
ing additional resources specifically
for this project. These assurances
renewed Tokelau’s focus on the pro-
ject and the drive toward achieving 
its objectives. The project became the
subject of a number of discussions
between Tokelau Public Service Com-
missioner Aleki Silao, and members of
the Council of Faipule—consisting of
three elected government officials rep-
resenting three villages—which is the
executive arm of government.
256 the contemporary pacific • spr ing 2001
The key issue in these discussions
was how to support the Tokelau lead-
ership in the process of achieving the
project. Among the issues explored
was the need to bring together all the
desired skills and experience from the
atolls, as well as from Tokelauans
overseas, with the aim of assisting the
leadership in their decision making
about Tokelau’s future. The guiding
principles envisioned for this support
were “partnership” and “leadership.”
The interrelated topics discussed in
the meetings centered on three general
concerns. First, effective leadership
and representation were considered
vital aspects of the project in that they
would help steer a course toward the
establishment of a solid foundation
for the Modern House of Tokelau.
Second, the leaders saw a need to for-
mulate a long-term development plan
that would take into account the
issues considered major barriers to
Tokelau’s progress. It would include
reviews of the strengths and weak-
nesses, as well as perceived threats, 
of current Tokelau governance and
administrative structures. Third was
the need to look at investment, capac-
ity building, and development of infra-
s t ru c t u re .
As a result of these deliberations 
a proposal was made for a two-team
approach to mht issues; the first team
would maintain the current opera-
tions of the Tokelau Public Service,
and the second would be a transition
team to develop a strategic frame-
work to highlight how the project
would progress. Options were then
considered on how to proceed with
the mht project at a pace determined
by the leaders of Tokelau. Public Ser-
vice Commissioner Aleki Silao pre-
pared a summary of the preliminary
discussions for the Council of Faipule
(Silao 2 0 0 0a). It proposed two options
for the Council of Faipule and the
three Pulenuku (elected village may-
ors) to debate before the June sitting
of the General Fono. The first option
was for the three Faipule and the thre e
Pulenuku to visit all three Taupulega
( v i l l a ge c o u n c i l s ). The second w as f o r
each village council and Faipule to
discuss the proposal among themselves
with the assistance of the public ser-
vice commissioner. With each option,
the objective was to reach consensus
on the merits of the proposed pro j e c t .
The Council of Faipule chose the
first option and, with the availability
of the mv Tokelau, the Faipule and
Pulenuku visited and held discussions
with the three village councils. All
endorsed the proposed project and
expressed full support for it, noting
that past leaders also shared this
dream. Despite the consensus, the
village councils advised a “make haste
slowly” approach. The elders pre-
dicted rough seas ahead and caut i o n e d
that Tokelau must proceed with care.
The tasks relating to the project, they
counseled, must be based on the tra-
ditional way of life while recognizing
the uniqueness of each village.
Five of the points raised during the
deliberations were:
• The main reason for the dual
authority experienced in Tokelau
since the 1970s was the establish-
ment and strengthening of the
Tokelau Public Service in Smoa.
• From the beginning, Tokelau’s
“stern paddle” has always been
the three village councils.
• The mhp project does not include
any timetable from the United
Nations, but is directed toward
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Tokelau’s preparation for self-
government.
• At present the villages are not
capable of delivering certain
activities and services; therefore
a central government body must
provide them.
• Women’s representation in the
village councils is one of the
issues that must be addressed 
in the house-building process.
The project proposal was officially
endorsed by the General Fono of 29
June 2000. It was the product of close
collaboration among Tokelau Public
Service Commissioner Aleki Silao,
Administrator of Tokelau Lyndsay
Watt, Tokelau Constitutional Advisor
Tony Angelo, and officials from the
New Zealand Overseas Development
Agency and New Zealand Audit.
Three key groups have different
roles to play in the project. The first
is a Joint Committee, the organizers,
comprising the Council of Faipule, the
Administrator of Tokelau, and the
Tokelau Public Service Commissioner.
To reflect the spirit expressed in the
mht project to reempower Tokelau’s
traditional leaders, the public service
commissioner proposed successfully
that the three Pulenuku be included in
this committee. The second group is
the Transition Team, the facilitators,
made up of four members—two from
the Tokelau Public Service and two
seconded from the New Zealand Pub-
lic Service. This team is to provide the
necessary skills to support Tokelau in
implementing its modern house. Some
of their specific roles include review-
ing and collating all ongoing services
and projects, whether operated by the
g o v e rnment, the village, or nongovern-
mental organizations. They will also
undertake analyses, highlighting the
main ideas expressed in the Green
Paper (ssc 1999), and will follow up
decisions by the three village councils
and the General Fono. The third
group will include action teams with
responsibilities for implementing
activities to resolve key issues.
The Transition Team met in Apia
in May to prepare mht-related docu-
ments for the June General Fono.
Among other things, the team high-
lighted the main ideas expressed in
the background papers on the mht
concept. Other sources reviewed
included mission statements and doc-
uments authored by either Tokelau or
New Zealand officials since the 1 9 8 0s .
One of the key ideas identified was
“The foundation upon which Tokelau
is built, and still remains . . . is the
village.” They also noted that there is
now recognition by all parties (Toke-
l a u, N e w Z e a l a n d, t he United Nations,
and others) that the traditional leader-
ship, namely the village councils, 
represents the source of Tokelau
authority; that the pursuit of self-gov-
ernment has been an agenda item for
some time; and that several attempts
have been made to achieve this objec-
tive. Models have been implemented
based on New Zealand experience
(such as governance and public sector
reforms).
The mht project has not officially
started yet, but with the approval of
the three councils and the General
Fono, the Joint Committee will hold
its first meeting in Apia in August.
They will consider a number of activ-
ities relating to the project for the
council elders to approve before
implementation, thereby marking the
beginning of the dreams envisioned in
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the project: “Re-empowering our
elders, strengthening the villages as
the foundation of the nation, and eco-
nomic development, leading to return-
ing the spirit of self-help and to the
greatest extent possible, the legacy
from our forefathers, are the three
central themes of the modern house
of Tokelau” (General Fono 1999).
Time may be the chief witness to the
fulfillment of these aspirations.
keli kalolo
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To n g a
The most important event of the year
turned out not to be Tonga’s claim to
be the first country in the world to
witness the new millennium. This bid
was hotly contested and, if worldwide
media coverage is considered the
judge, won by Kiribati in any case.
Rather, it was the 3 January appoint-
ment as prime minister of the king’s
youngest son, h r h Prince ‘Ulukalala-
Lavaka-Ata. The prince, who is in his
forties, is married to the eldest daugh-
ter of the retiring premier, seventy-
nine-year-old Baron Vaea, and has a
teenage daughter and two sons. As the
Crown Prince remains unmarried, the
new prime minister or his eldest son
conceivably could succeed to the
throne. The prime minister has been
educated overseas, his latest degrees
being in strategic policy and inter-
national relations gained at master’s
level from universities in the Austra-
lian Capital Territory and in Queens-
land. His appointment to office
appears to be in line with the wishes
of the Crown Prince, who declined
the post largely because he would not
have been able to appoint his own
cabinet ministers, a prerogative that
belongs to the reigning monarch.
Instead, the older brother will concen-
trate on his business affairs and under-
take other activities on behalf of his
aging father, who turned eighty-two
on 4 July 2000. Hopefully, his
younger brother will give youthful
momentum to government leadership.
Although it was rather a surprise, 
the last six months has shown the
appointment to be a popular and
effective one.
The major political issue continues
to be the state of the economy. The
last elections showed a decline in fer-
vor regarding the movement toward
democracy in favor of elected repre-
sentatives who were more likely to
come to grips with the problems of
the struggling private sector. While
tourism has shown some pro g ress and,
during the widely touted millennial
celebrations, made some gain from
Tonga’s location on the International
Dateline, most other major industries,
except fisheries, are showing little
progress. The tertiary sector has
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g rown at a greater rate than other sec-
tors over the last ten years, due mainly
to the addition of two commercial
banks, and businesses belonging to the
C rown Prince, the Princess Royal, and
a few prominent commoners. Agricul-
ture appears in decline as far as the
value of production for both the local
and export markets is concerned. Both
of the “hopefuls,” tourism and fish-
eries, need substantial investment
from overseas to realize their poten-
tial. It is widely hoped that the new
prime minister, with or without his
brother’s guidance, will be able to
provide ideas, confidence, and cohe-
sion in a more concerted and, impor-
tantly, a more coordinated, push for
economic growth.
Just before the conclusion of the
year under review and after much dis-
cussion, the Tongan parliament finally
passed a t$43 million budget. Follow-
ing a cabinet decision in May, an esti-
mated t$3.5-to-4 million of it will be
spent on a 20 percent increase in the
cost-of-living allowance for all civil
servants. This is the first major raise
they have had for six years. Since
1989, two cost-of-living allowance
increases have been awarded: one of
10 percent on 1 November 1995, and
another of 5 percent on 1 July 1999.
There is some speculation as to where
the money for the salary increases will
be found. The government announced
it would make up the amount thro u g h
cost-cutting and savings brought
about by a more economical manage-
ment of resources and a greater effi-
ciency in its operations, especially in
the collection of revenue arrears.
This optimism and, indeed, the
entire budget were questioned in the
Legislative Assembly. Dr Fred Sevele,
the Tongatapu Number 2 People’s
R e p resentative, asked how the govern-
ment can afford a pay hike for public
servants when, just a few months ago,
the outgoing prime minister said the
country was on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. He fears that the government
will be forced to curtail its services to
meet the projected pay raise, 10 per-
cent of which will be awarded from 
1 July 2000, and 10 percent from 
1 January 2001. Minister of Finance
the Honorable K T Fakafanua re p l i e d
that the economy is growing by 6.1
percent. Sevele said that he had no
indication from the Tongan business
community that the economy was
g rowing at such a rate. “Obviously,
the two statements from the [finance]
minister and the former prime minis-
ter cannot both be true,” he said 
(TC, 22 June 2000, 20).
Indeed, the way the figures are pre-
sented makes for some confusion and
ambiguity of interpretation. The bud-
get statement for 2000–01 reports
that the Tongan economy achieved 
an average annual growth rate of 
2.8 percent over the last six years, 
an improvement over the previous
five years. The 1999–2000 fiscal year
was estimated to show a growth rate
of 6.1 percent (in real terms), an
increase f rom 4.6 p e rcent re c o rded in
1998–99. The economy, furthermore,
is projected to increase by 2 percent
in 2000 –01 (TC, 8 June 2000, Kalo-
nikali Budget Supplement, 4). Presum-
ably, these calculations arrive at the
quoted figure of over 6 percent.
During this period, the government
will undertake also a t$14 million
program loan from the Asia Devel-
opment Bank designed to encourage
private sector–led economic growth,
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through policies conducive to
increased investment and employ-
ment, and to improve the delivery of
s e rvices by the public sector. The pro-
gram will review the current civil ser-
vice capacity and remuneration. As a
result, argued the minister, it is vital
for the government and the country at
large to employ and maintain a com-
petent and highly qualified civil ser-
vice. Hence the raise in pay, presum-
ably to prevent a trickle of top-level
civil servants to the private sector.
The loan will be used in part to
finance the govern m e n t ’s taking over
of responsibility for telecommunica-
tion services following the close of the
Cable and Wireless contract period,
which coincided with the end of the
current political and financial year.
Koliniasi Afuha‘amango, the seventy-
two-year-old People’s Representative
for Vava‘u, who after repeated tries
finally entered parliament in a by-
election held on 18 May to replace
the late William Harris, was heard to
remark that the Asian Development
Bank loan would merely float the 
civil service pay raise. The minister 
of finance failed to rise to this jibe.
Mr Afuha‘amango works for the
Tonga Human Rights and Democracy
Movement, of which he has been a
long-time supporter. The movement
has not promoted a high public pro-
file since it failed to gain the over-
whelming victory that it expected in
the last general elections held at the
beginning of 1999. Sadly, also, its
influential intellectual proponent, 
the redoubtable Futa Helu, has not
enjoyed good health this past year.
The future of the movement as a sig-
nificant social force overall remains 
in doubt.
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